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This paper has three purposes. First, we discuss under which condi-
tions a Central Bank should include nancial asset prices in its objectives
function and how this a¤ects the optimal monetary policy in a rational
expectations forward-looking model. Second, we show that the volatility of
the policy instrument (i.e. nominal interest rate) is modied compared to
the case where nancial asset prices do not appear in the monetary policy
loss function. We nd that the volatility of nominal interest rate is lower
in the rst case when the economy faces demand shocks contrary to supply
and nancial shocks. In both cases, the reaction of monetary policy instru-
ments to several shocks in the economy is depending on the sensibility of
aggregate demand to real stock prices. Third, we show that the shape of
the nominal-interest rate response to shocks depends on the weights given
to ination targeting and nancial stabilitys goal.
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Note that by denition the higher the earnings/price ratio, the lower the cost of risk capital.
Even if the situations about real estate prices and the banking system are quite di¤erent,
the recent experience in the United States presents some similar developments like Japan in the
80s.
The interest of Central Banks in the evolution of nancial markets has appeared
in a explicit way in the last three years. Indeed, one can frequently read in the
comments of the monetary policy committee that, beside the problem with the
long-run productivity growth, the state of nancial markets has become another
important source of uncertainty. This uncertainty can bear on two aspects. The
rst one deals with the impact of real stock prices on aggregate demand. We can
suppose that impact produces a wealth e¤ect on consumption (Poterba, 2000)
and a cost e¤ect on investment (Wadhwani, 1999). The second one is to wonder
to what extent, in case of huge crises, a nancial instability involves a macroeco-
nomic one. Some authors associate several periods of economic weakness with
a collapse of nancial markets (see Bernanke and Lown (1991) for the United
States and Bernanke and Gertler (1999) for emerging markets). We may also
fear that severe corrections on stock markets may entail a huge condence crisis
for a long time. In this case, a nancial crisis would hit all agents whatever their
implications in the stock markets.
By the way, an interesting example is the Japanese experience during the
eighties. Before the collapse of the nancial markets, Japan had enjoyed low
ination and strong growth for several years. Moreover these developments oc-
cured against a backdrop of an appreciating yen, high rates of investment and
accelerating productivity growth as well as large increases in stock and real
estate prices (see gure 1.1).
So the question faced by the Bank of Japan was whether it needed or not to
tighten monetary policy. It would have been for the government to implement
a restrictive monetary policy and to receive public support while experiencing
low ination and high productivity growth rate .
In a matter of few years, stock and land prices tripled. From the level of
11,542 points at the end of 1984, the Nikkei index went up to 38,915 ve years
later. Two years later, the Commercial Land Price Index for large cities in-
creased from 38.4 in 1986 to 103.0 at the beginning of the nineties. During
this period, the real growth rate of gross domestic product grew 26%, fed on
private consumption (+25%), housing investment (+53%) and industrial invest-



















a target for nancial asset prices, the Central Bank shows deliberately its will
to prevent any nancial market collapse.
First, we nd that the magnitude of the nominal-interest rate response de-
pends on the nature of economic shocks. So that in case of demand shocks the
monetary policy reaction is inferior to the case where monetary authorities only
follow stabilization targets for output gap and ination. Second, we nd that
the volatility of the nominal interest rate decreases when the sensibility of ag-
gregate demand to stock market uctuations increases. Third, we show that the
arbitrage between ination targeting and nancial stability targeting modies
the shape of the nominal-interest rate response.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section II presents the theoretical model
with its informational structure : a new keneysian model with perfect competi-
tion and forward-looking rational expections. Section III justies the integration
of a nancial stability parameter as a new target that should be integrated in
the monetary policy reaction function. Section IV discusses the results. Section
V deals with the trade-o¤ between ination targeting and nancial asset prices
targeting policies while section VI o¤ers some concluding remarks.
In a context of a new keynesian model with perfect competition and forward-
looking expectations, we consider the case of a closed economy. Aggregates de-
mand and supply are equalized. However, aggregate demand is partly inuenced
by stock market prices, which are determined by the dividend discount model.
The aggregate demand is a standard IS function involving a negative e¤ect from
the expected real interest rate and a positive one from an exogenous disturbance,
. Additionally, we assume that real stock prices evolution inuences the real
aggregate demand, , through consumption as well as industrial investment .
Recent works in the litterature nd some empirical evidence of this assumption
(Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) or Poterba (2000)). The real aggregate demand
then becomes :
(2.1)
where is a constant, is the nominal-interest rate at date t, and is the real
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2.2. Aggregate supply
2.3. Stock market dynamics
The wage level is expected to clear the labour market. Later, during the period, rms learn
the price from the output market and the contract which maximizes their prots. Because that
price level is not known when the contract is made, the expected utility-maximization strategy
for wage setters is thus to pose an equalization between wages, , and the expected price level,
, and then . Substituting this prediction in the supply function results in a familiar
predicton error model of supply (see Gray (1976) and Fischer (1977)) like our equation.
Note that by denition the real required return on stocks by investors, which is equal to
the cost of risk capital for rms, is a positive function of the expected growth of earnings and a
negative function of the contemporaneous real stock price. This specication will be useful for
the discussion in the next section.
in which and are respectively the price level at
date t and at date t+1.
The real aggregate supply, ,which can be derived from prot maximization un-
der perfect competition with nominal rigidities, assumes that the nominal wage
is set in a labour contract prior the realization of the price level . This function
reects the maximizing behavior of private agents on localized markets when
they have only partial information about contemporaneous nominal aggregates:
(2.2)
So, aggregate supply can deviate from its natural level either by deviations
of current prices from expectations or by exogenous technological shocks .
Deviations of current prices from expectations are represented by the terms
where is the expectation at date t-1 on the price level in the
next period, at date t.
On the stock market, we assume that the real stock price, , follows an arbitrage
condition according to which the expected return on equities must be equal to
the expected real riskless interest rate plus a time-varying risk premium, .



























































where the expected capital gains are representedby , while the expected
real dividends are . In turn, the real dividends at date t+1 are equal to
the real production level in the previous period, so that:
(2.4)
We also dene the real stock price, , in the following way :
(2.5)
where is the nominal stock price and is the expected price level at date
t since is not contemporaneously observed.
Production satises the following equilibrium condition :
(2.6)
We assume that aggregate price and output levels are only known with a lag
of one period as it is usually the case in practice. However, nominal nancial
prices can be observed contemporenously on the markets where they are quoted
so that and .
The economy also faces several kinds of shocks. In the spirit of the real
business cycle analysis, we assume that the supply shock is a random walk :
(2.7)
where is white noise, while the aggregate demand disturbance is rst order
auto-correlated, i.e. its e¤ects on output disappear over time :
(2.8)
where is white noise and . This comes from the fact that we deal
with the supply shock as a technological one where the e¤ects on the output are

























3.1. Beyond traditional objectives
3. Monetary Policy Rule and Stock Market Prices
t







































































Note that in the follow of the paper we will ignore uninteresting constants.
The loss function of the Central Bank traditionnally presented in textbooks follows an
objective of macroeconomic stability. It consists generally in an arbitrage between minimizing
deviations from the trend in the long-run production and deviations from an ination target.
It can be noted that the presence of ination as the only macroeconomic variable in addition
to output in this kind of loss function reects in part the fact that, right or wrong, ination
is perceived as costly by people and is costly for policymakers to ignore (see Blanchard and
Fischer, 1989, Chap.11).
Combining eqs. 2.1, 2.2, 2.5, 2.6 and collecting the terms in , we obtain :
(2.9)
which is the rule that prices have to follow to clear the goods market. Since the
current price level is unobservable, people may only rely on a guess about this
price level using available information. This guess is the price perception .
Taking the expectation of both sides of equation 2.9, we obtain the following
rule for :
(2.10)
Let note as the price perception error . Since the nominal prices
for nancial variables are observable, and , we can write
the value of as follows :
(2.11)
Our proposal is to modify the traditional objective function of the monetary
authorities in order to include an explicit target for stock prices. In that way
the Central Bank would pursue a macroeconomic stability target as well as a
nancial stability one.
Several academics have tried to justify the incorporation of such a target
in the monetary policy reaction function. First, many authors argue that the









It seems to be clear that such a problem restricted the real activity in Japan from 1992 to
1996.
See for details Bernanke and Gertler (1995 and 1999).
The two more recent examples of such a situation were given by the 1997 exchange rate
crisis in Asia and the Russian nancial crisis in 1998 with the near collapse of the hedge fund
Long Term Capital Managment.
This justication comes from the banking crises literature and from private discussion with
Professor Jean-Charles Rochet.
only reects the price evolution of the real sector. From this point of view, the
monetary policy would have to follow an ination targeting in the real sector as
well as in the nancial sector. Asset prices might constitute an adequate index
for the latter (see Alchian and Klein, 1973).
Second, as explained by Wadhwani (1999), we may think that systematic
overvaluations of asset prices may increasingly entail a misallocationof resources,
as would an acceleration of the CPI. Since the earnings/price ratio reects the
level of the cost of risk capital, a sharp increase of stock prices reduces sub-
stantially this cost and could involve an over-investment in equipement and/or
buildings from rms.
Third, on new markets, the nancing of acquisitions by start-ups may also
be disturbed by deep uctuations of stock prices. This situation creates an un-
certainty for companies extension plans.
Fourth, a nancial crisis inuences solvability of many nancial intermedi-
aries and then could a¤ect the activity of rms through a rationing of credits
(the so-called credit crunch ). The implicit assumption is to suppose that price
stability and nancial stability are deeply complementary in order to maintain
a sustainable non inationary growth. However, as mentioned by Bernanke and
Gertler (1999), there exists national and supranational organisations which con-
trol the solvability of nancial institutions but, unfortunately, history shows us
many periods where the reaction of those organisations came after the crises .
Following Solows idea that central banks are responsible for the nancial sta-
bility, we can also argue that high volatilities of risky-asset prices increase the
probability of failures of nancial institutions. If the central bank does not
include the nancial stability as a monetary policy target, we would have to
accept either an increasing number of failures, or an increasing capital to create
a nancial institution. Whatever the case, it would be costly for the economy .
Finally, we may suppose that a nancial crisis a¤ects indirectly the real
activity through a condence e¤ect. Even if the proportion of agents who own



















































3.2. A Global Economic Stability Function Reaction
event a prolonged depression of stock market prices would a¤ect the households
condence, whatever their implication in stock markets.
Based on the arguments in the previous section, our proposal is to modify the
traditional ination targeting reaction function of the Central Bank in order to
include explicitely a nancial stability target. Therefore, beside the minimiza-
tion of deviations from their targets for production and ination, the Central
Bank aims to minimize deviations of real current stock prices index from some
target. The loss function, , then becomes :
(3.1)
In each period, the Central Bank tends to minimize this function. The
Central Bank observes the fundamentals in the economy and the several shocks
and modies the nominal interest rate in order to satisfy its policy objectives.
Therefore the monetary authorities pursue three objectives. First, they intend
to minimize any deviations from the long-run production trend (denoted here
by ). Second, they want to stabilize the current ination rate around the
target . Third, in order to preserve nancial stability, they explicitely want
to stabilize stock market prices around the target . Note that the authorities
target for stock prices depends on the long-run productions trend. Thus is
equal to ( ).
The monetary policy feedback rule can thus be written as :
(3.2)
where denotes the Central Bank instrument (e.g. the nominal interest rate),
, , respectively the monetary policy target for production, ination and stock
price level. also depends on the agents expectations on the various shocks
in the economy while is the information set at the time the interest rate
is set. Note that since we consider as a technological shock, it could a¤ect
permanently the expected real dividends (and then the real stock prices) as well
as the potential output.
The Central Bank minimizes its objective in each period, given the previous
expectations since we assume that policy is conducted without a pre-
commitment ability. But expectations are rational, so that private agents know
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4.1. Solving the model
4.1.1. Deriving the optimal monetary policy
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expectations by e¤ectively solving the problem that the Central Bank has to
solve. Monetary policy is thus the outcome of a non-cooperative game between
the Central Bank and private agents. However, since the objective function
is such that there is no reason to behave in a time-inconsistent manner, the
rules-based and discretionary solutions will coincide in this case.
We solve the model mainly in three steps. First, by deriving the monetary policy
function, we nd the rule that the price expectations follow taking the specica-
tion of the model in order to nd the specication of the nominal interest rate.
Second, taking the specication of the nominal interest rate, we replace it in the
arbitrage conditon for stock prices and in the equation of the expected prices
level. We then obtain, after all substitutions, a system of three linear equations
in , and conditioned on expectations , and . Using
the method of the undetermined coe¢cients, we solve these three equations to
nd the solutions at equilibrium.
Using equation 2.2 and the denition of the ination rate (i.e. ),
equation 3.1 can be rewritten as :
(4.1)




We replace by its value in equation 4.1 using eqs. 2.5. We then take the rst-
order condition, , characterizing the optimum which, after distributing































Note that by denition using equation (2.11).
2

































































































































































() ( + )
+( 1 ) (( +) + (+) ) +( + )
+ ( ( +) +(+) )
+ (1 )( + ) + (1 ( + )) ( + )






+( ( + 1))
+( ( + ))
+( )
=
() ( + )
(+ )
+( + )




















 '   
 E p
 
 '     ' E p

  '  EL

   '
      "

  '  "
  ' "
Ep










 '   
 E p
   ' E p
   ' E L
  '     ' "
  ' "
  ' "

  ' ' 

the expectation factor and using equation 2.7, implies :
(4.4)
We subsitute the value of given by equation 4.3 in eqs. 4.2 and 4.4. We then
equalize eqs. 4.2 and 4.4 in order to nd the value of . We then substitute
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Note for instance that , and reduce to zero if the weight for nancial system stability
in the loss function of the monetary authorities, , is zero. In this case, the value of the
coe¢cient of past demand shock, , in the interest rate equilibrium solution becomes equal to
. The latter value corresponds to the value of the demand shock coe¢cient when the
nancial system stability does not play any role in the objective function of the Central Bank
(see Smets, 1997).
See Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay(1997) and Dor and Durré (2000).
These equations form a system of three linear equations in , and
conditioned on expectations , and . To solve them, we use
the method of undetermined coe¢cients and we nd that at equilibrium each




Especially in the case of the monetary policy instrument, we nd that the
nominal interest rate at equilibrium, , becomes :
(4.8)
where , , and
.
As we can see, the feedback rule of monetary policy has to react, in the
case where nancial stability becomes a policy target, to the contemporaneous
shock on asset prices and to past shocks on aggregates demand and supply
with two lags periods. In order to discuss clearly the results of the model,
we calibrated the model using values for non strategic variables from empirical
evidence reported in the literature. We assume then that , and
. Moreover, we have to estimate the value of the policy parameters, ,
and . For instance, we take the simple case where the Central Bank allocates
the same weight to each objective (i.e. ).
1516
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4.2. E¤ects on the nominal interest rate of past demand shocks
We hear by traditional monetary policy objectives a central bank loss function which
minimizes any deviations of current output and prices from its long-run target as explained in
Blanchard and Fischer (1989).
It is important to remember that the Central Bank will in our context hit the
perceived prices to its desired level. So, it modies its policy instrument in order
to reach this objective. In case of a positive demand shock, the aggregate de-
mand increases which, for a given level of production, makes ination pressures.
Following its policy specication function, the Central Bank reacts in increasing
its nominal interest rates to avoid any deviations of perceived prices from its
target. But the increase of the interest rate in turn decreases equity prices which
makes downwards pressures on aggregate demand.
In the case of traditional monetary policy objectives , this mechanism ex-
plains why the optimal reaction to demand shocks of the monetary policy is
inferior in the case where there exists a wealth e¤ect of asset prices on aggre-
gate demand. But now, if there exists explicitely in the objective function of
Central Bank a nancial target, the monetary authorities will care about the
impact of the interest rate reaction on equity prices compared to their target. In
other words, at the rst stage, past demand shocks have a negative impact on
equity prices through the reaction of the interest rate to the increasing aggre-
gate demand. But this decrease of equity prices does not reect any revision of
expected future dividends since expected future production remains unchanged.
So, in the case where nancial stability is included in the Central Bank loss
function (case b hereafter, gure 4.2.), the reaction of the interest rate to past
demand shocks will be lower than in the case of an ination-output targeting
(case a hereafter, gure 4.1.).
On the other hand, it is important to note that the slope of the interest
rate is deeper in case a than in case b. In the case b, when the sensibility of
aggregate demand to stock prices is relatively high (say near one), we could
imagine a decrease of the interest rate.
The explanation of these developments is lying in the fact that, in case b,
monetary authorities have to react in a two-step channel. The rst one consists
to modify the interest rate so that the increase of aggregate demand does not
feed into inationary pressures. The second stage consists to check that the
variation of the interest rate, and thus its impact on stock prices, is compatible
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Note that, here, the nancial shock, , is white noise. We then implicitly suppose that the
Central Bank reacts at the end of each period, after all other agents. We could alternatively
suppose that the nancial shock, , is rst order auto-correlated. In this case,
and , where . At equilibrium, the nominal interest
rate then becomes which is di¤erent to equation 4.5.
In other words, two terms in and are added to equation 4.8. Note that
and .
Now suppose that the stock market faces a positive shock. In that case the
increase of the current risk premium depresses the stock prices according to the
dividend discount model used for evaluation of risky asset prices. The decrease
of the stock prices inuences negatively aggregate demand (in a proportion ).
The production perspectives being unchanged, any downwards pressures on ag-
gregate demand would a¤ect negatively prices. In order to avoid the latter evo-
lution, the monetary authorities brings down the nominal interest rate to rise
aggregate demand. As we can see in gures below, the higher the sensibility of
aggregate demand to nancial asset prices, the higher the nominal interest rate
response to nancial shocks.
However, it could be interesting to note that, in case b (where monetary au-
thorities follow nancial stability as a policy goal), the response of the nominal-
interest rate to nancial shocks is quite higher than in case a (where monetary
authorities are only trying to minimize the ouput gap and deviations of prices
from their target). Not surprisingly that could be understood because the nan-
cial shock (as well as a technological shock) a¤ects directly the price of stocks.
Then, with a goal of nancial stability, monetary authorities have to react, on

































5. Trade-o¤ between ination targeting and nancial asset
prices targeting
The Ludvigson and Steindel study underlines some important di¤erences between the sub-
periods. Indeed, they estimate a much larger e¤ect (where the value of is equal to ) for
the 1976-1985 sample and a smaller e¤ect ( ) for the post-1986 period. While these
di¤erences in the value of a¤ect the magnitude of the interest rate reaction, they keep the
shape of the reaction unchanged.
This is compatible with the weight given to this objective in the context of a Taylors rule
(see for example Gerlach and Schnabel, 1999).
It could be interesting to discuss the di¤erences in the conduct of monetary
policy following a variation in the weight of the ination targeting and the
nancial asset prices stability for any given value of . For the latter, we use
the more recent empirical study of Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) who nd a
value of 0.04 for over the period 1953-1997 .
If we look now the discussion about the impact of a weight variation between
the ination target and the nancial stability one within the central bank loss
function, it becomes easier to understand why the magnitude of the nominal-
interest rate is lower in case of demand shocks and higher in case of supply and
nancial shocks.
For convenience of the purpose, we suppose that the weight given to the
output gap (e.g. ) is . We then let uctuate the weights given to the
ination target (e.g. ) and to the nancial stability target (e.g. ) according to
the following rule : . The following gures show the nominal-interest
rate response to the several shocks in the economy when and uctuate
between and , the other parameters being given.
When the economy faces a positive demand shock, the nominal-interest rate
response will be positive for any value of inferior to (e.g. for any value for
higher than ). Higher the weight given to nancial stability target, lower the
increase of nominal interest rate in case of a positive demand shock. Contrary
to the two other shocks, it could be interesting to note that the magnitude
of nominal-interest rate response to a positive demand shock is inferior when
the monetary authorities include nancial stability as a policy target. This
could nd its explanation in the fact that from a value superior to for , the
monetary authorities could decrease nominal interest rate in order to maintain
stock market prices evoltuion compatible to the policy target level (as shown in
gure 5.1).
Concerning the nominal-interest rate response to supply shocks, two aspects
216. Concluding Remarks
When discussing about the relation between monetary policy and asset prices
uctuations, one usually concentrates to the question on the potential wealth
e¤ect of the latter on aggregate demand. The analysis usually consists then
to wonder if, in a context of minimizing output gap and ination targeting,
monetary authorities should take into account uctuations on nancial markets.
The most recent study on this question is lying in the Geneva Report on World
Economy 2.
The purpose of our paper pushes the reection on monetary policy and -
nancial markets relation further. First, we suppose that aggregate demand is
positively inuenced by uctuations on nancial markets. Second, we defend
a nancial stability target. To the extent that nancial markets crises can-
bring macroeconomic instability, it is the interest of Central banks to integrate
a nancial stability parameter as a priority.
In a forward-looking rational expectations model, where monetary authori-
ties care about output gap, ination and nancial stability (called global eco-
nomic stability hereafter), we nd the following results :
- When monetary policy takes account of the role played by nancial prices
in the monetary transmission mechanism the optimal monetary policy reaction
to shocks is inferior to what it would be otherwise.
- The Central Bank, when encounting a demand shock situation, will inter-
vene in a more subtile way on interest rates, if it had chosen to include nancial
stability as a priority.
- However if shocks do directly a¤ect stock prices (permanently or tempo-
rary), the reaction of monetary authorities is quite higher.
- The shape of the nominal-interest rate response to several shocks in the
economy depends on the relative weight given to each objective within the cen-
tral bank loss function. The higher the weight given to the nancial stability
target, the higher the nominal-interest rate reaction will be in case of supply
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